Fixed Income Insights
In a nutshell
Key takeaways
- The anchor for long term yields appears to have moved higher. Neutral rate estimates have risen, particularly in the US, as stronger investment demand and persistent fiscal deficits challenge the unusually low rate environment that followed the global financial crisis
- The adjustment is being driven more by real yields than by unanchored inflation expectations. Longer term inflation expectations remain relatively contained, while a rebuilding term premium is increasing the compensation investors require for holding duration
- There is no single global rate reset. The US combines stronger capital demand with a higher equilibrium rate, Europe remains structurally lower, and Japan is moving through a distinct inflation and monetary policy transition
- Duration is becoming increasingly country specific. Fiscal credibility, productivity, domestic savings and central bank balance sheet policy are playing a larger role in determining where investors are being compensated for taking long term rate risk
Rates: A global reset
Bond yields are moving higher as a combination of rising neutral real rates and term premia amid stronger investment, persistent deficits and reduced central-bank support. However, divergent inflation expectations and national fundamentals make duration decisions increasingly country-specific.
Higher bond yields suggest a rise in neutral interest rates and higher term premia
Long-dated yields have moved materially higher, as a result of higher short-term rates, and rebuilding term premia. The adjustment has been relatively orderly, with long term inflation expectations remaining contained, while economies have generally proved more resilient to higher borrowing costs than many expected.
Some explanation of these moves arise from the idea that neutral real interest rates, or r*, may now be higher than during the decade after the global financial crisis. The neutral rate is the real interest rate consistent with an economy operating at its potential with neither upward or downward pressure on inflation. These neutral rates cannot be observed directly so the range of estimates tends to be wide, particularly considering the mix of economic and financial data used for estimation. The experiences and macro regimes across developed markets vary too, factors such as productivity, demographics, fiscal policy, and investment demand result in considerable differences across countries.
Several forces point towards a higher r* than prevailed in the decade after the financial crisis
The years following the financial crisis were unusual. Weak investment demand, subdued productivity, abundant global savings and persistent disinflation allowed policy rates and long-term yields to remain exceptionally low. However, investment demand is now rising, particularly around artificial intelligence and the infrastructure required to support it. If the AI investment cycle leads to productivity improvements and companies see greater opportunities to invest, the economy can sustain a higher real rate without becoming restrictive.
Persistent government deficits also imply higher rates, especially with central banks reducing their support for bond markets. Additionally, geopolitical fragmentation and tighter labour supply can increase the real rate required to keep inflation pressures contained.
Yet the pressures do not all point the same way. Ageing populations can reduce investment demand and increase retirement saving. Large global saving pools – including China’s external surplus – can suppress equilibrium rates. AI itself could also ease upwards pressure on rates. Although the investment boom raises capital demand and could lift productivity, if technological disruption increases uncertainty around jobs and incomes, households may save more, creating an offsetting force.
Figure 1: Primary drivers of the neutral rate
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Source: HSBC Asset Management, September 2026.
The US provides the clearest evidence that equilibrium rates have moved higher
Model-based estimates suggest that the US real neutral rate has risen relative to the decade after the global financial crisis, with the current central estimate across eleven models around 1.2 per cent. Considerable uncertainty surrounds that figure. Models infer the neutral rate from economic and financial data, and their different assumptions produce a wide range of estimates. The dispersion therefore reflects meaningful differences in how the models interpret the economy.
Figure 2: Model based measures of US neutral rate
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Figure 3: Estimates of the US neutral nominal policy rate (per cent)
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Source: Oxford Economics, Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Macrobond, Models are Holston-Laubach-Williams, Lubik‑Matthes and Zaman. HSBC Asset Management, September 2026.
Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest / Lubik-Matthes Natural Rate of Interest | Richmond Fed / Neutral Interest Rates and the Monetary Policy Stance
Macro models generally tie their estimates more closely to economic fundamentals, but can respond slowly to new developments and remain sensitive to revisions to trend growth and the output gap. Financial-market models capture shifts in expectations more quickly, although risk premia and market positioning can also influence their estimates. These approaches provide complementary perspectives on the neutral rate.
Survey evidence also points to a gradual upward shift. By June 2026, the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Expectations showed a median longer-run federal funds-rate expectation of 3.1 per cent, with the middle half of responses between 3.0 per cent and 3.5 per cent. Survey responses cluster more tightly than model estimates, possibly because respondents draw on similar information and analytical frameworks. That agreement offers a useful indication of consensus, but does not necessarily imply less uncertainty about the underlying neutral rate.
Taken together, the model and survey evidence suggests a central nominal neutral-rate estimate of approximately 3.1–3.3 per cent. Our working assumption of 3.5 per cent sits moderately above that range, allowing for the upward drift in expectations and potential upside risks. The evidence supports a higher neutral rate than prevailed after the financial crisis, while leaving substantial uncertainty about its precise level.
The term premium – the compensation investors require for holding longer duration bonds rather than repeatedly investing at short maturities – explains more of the rise in yields of longer bonds
Notwithstanding the recent decline, two-year Treasury yields have risen through 2026 as markets priced in tighter policy but remain below their 2024 highs. Yet, 10- and 30-year yields are above the levels seen a few years ago. This suggests the market is demanding additional compensation for holding treasury bonds further out the curve. At the same time, the relationship between oil prices and government bond yields has strengthened, possibly reflecting concern around supply shocks.
Long term inflation expectations do not appear to be the main source of the move. US breakeven inflation remains around the low-to-mid 2 per cent range, while the much larger adjustment has occurred in real yields, which have moved from deeply negative levels and are now close to those seen in the mid-2000s.
Figure 4: Short rates don’t fully explain the move
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Figure 5: UST 10y decomposition (per cent)
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Source: Macrobond, HSBC Asset Management, September 2026.
Before the global financial crisis, investors normally demanded positive compensation for taking duration risk. The US 10-year term premium averaged around 1.25 per cent. It subsequently collapsed, at times becoming negative, as quantitative easing, strong demand for safe assets and low inflation volatility suppressed the compensation investors required for duration.
Since 2021, it has rebuilt to around 0.75 per cent. Increased government issuance, declining central bank bond purchases and uncertainty around fiscal sustainability all provide reasons for that premium to remain higher than in the post crisis period.
Figure 6: Average of Kim-Wright and New York Fed 10y term premium estimates (pp)
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Source: Macrobond, HSBC Asset Management, September 2026.
The implication might be that the post-2008 period is no longer the appropriate benchmark against which to judge yields and that investors can reassess what constitutes a “normal” long term yield.
The same argument does not apply equally across developed markets
In the euro area, structural forces point to a relatively low neutral rate. Model estimates put the real equilibrium rate around zero, which translates into a nominal rate close to 2 per cent if inflation is anchored near target. Slower productivity growth, weaker demographics and lower trend rate of investment demand all help explain why the euro area equilibrium rate remains below the US.
There is nevertheless evidence of some upward drift. The economy has absorbed higher rates better than expected, bank lending remains relatively firm and recent policy discussion has increasingly acknowledged the possibility that the upper end of the neutral rate range has moved towards 2.5 per cent.
If European equilibrium rates remain structurally lower than US rates, the adjustment required in long dated European yields may ultimately be more limited.
Figure 7: Cross country policy rate comparison (per cent)
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Source: Macrobond, HSBC Asset Management, September 2026.
Figure 8: Japan’s wage and inflation data
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Source: Macrobond, HSBC Asset Management, September 2026.
Japan’s real neutral rate remains close to zero in many models, reflecting ageing demographics and a long history of weak investment demand. However, an important shift is happening in nominal rates. Japan appears to be moving out of the disinflationary regime that defined much of the past three decades. Wage negotiations have produced increases above 5 per cent for three consecutive years, underlying inflation has moved higher, and companies are increasingly confident in passing costs through to prices.
The Bank of Japan is responding by moving away from an exceptionally accommodative stance. Its estimate of the nominal neutral rate range is roughly 1–2.5 per cent, while market pricing suggests policy is gradually moving towards that territory.
The challenge is that monetary normalisation is occurring alongside a more expansionary fiscal stance, which could continue to put pressure on longer dated Japanese government bond yields.
The rise in yields has become more differentiated across countries
Investors seem increasingly willing to distinguish more clearly between countries with credible consolidation plans and those where fiscal policy remains expansionary in the face of already stretched balance sheets.
Markets have generally placed greater pressure on countries where high debt burdens are combined with weaker productivity, limited fiscal flexibility or a more activist policy stance. This is particularly relevant for the UK and Japan.
Figure 9: Cumulative rise in 10yr govt bond yields above and beyond DM average
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Source: Macrobond, HSBC Asset Management, September 2026.
In the UK, weak productivity and limited room to raise taxes or reduce spending make the fiscal arithmetic difficult, leading investors to demand greater compensation for holding long duration government bonds.
In Japan, the question is whether higher public investment can raise productive capacity sufficiently to offset the fiscal burden. If it does not, the interaction between an expansionary fiscal stance and gradually tighter monetary policy could continue to put upward pressure on long term yields.
Higher neutral rates do not automatically imply that duration should be avoided.
A higher neutral rate means the long run floor for policy rates is above the levels that prevailed after the global financial crisis. Higher real yields and a rebuilding term premium also mean long dated government bonds may require more compensation than investors had become accustomed to.
But the adjustment is not uniform. For fixed-income investors, the market outcome isn’t as overarching as proclaiming “higher yields everywhere” but instead is better viewed as “a higher and more differentiated rate regime”. Understanding what is driving yields – neutral rates, real returns, term premia or fiscal risk – should matter increasingly for assessing whether investors are being adequately compensated for taking duration risk.
Source: HSBC Asset Management, November 2026.
The views expressed above were held at the time of preparation and are subject to change without notice. Any forecast, projection or target where provided is indicative only and not guaranteed in any way. HSBC Asset Management accepts no liability for any failure to meet such forecast, projection or target.
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