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Fixed Income Insights

Credit: Funding the AI frontier
12 November 2026
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    In a nutshell

    Key takeaways

    • AI is becoming a financing story as well as an earnings story. Hyperscaler investment is increasingly moving beyond what operating cash flow alone can fund, raising reliance on external capital.
    • Higher borrowing does not automatically mean weaker credit. The sustainability of the investment cycle depends on asset lives, utilization, contracted revenues and the pace at which new infrastructure begins to generate cash
    • Headline debt captures only part of the risk. Leases, guarantees and other off balance sheet commitments are becoming more important, increasing the need to distinguish between growth that is already funded and growth still dependent on the future market access
    • The same technology cycle is producing different credit outcomes across regions. US public markets are absorbing much of the bond supply, Asian investment remains more bank and project financed, while Europe hosts substantial infrastructure investment without carrying the same corporate financing burden

    Funding the AI frontier

    AI’s capital-intensive build-out is outgrowing hyperscaler cash flows, increasing reliance on external finance. Credit outcomes will depend on monetisation, secured funding and liability location, with risks differing materially across regions.

    With combined hyperscaler capital expenditure expected to exceed USD 5tn between 2026 and 2029, the AI build out has moved beyond what operating cash flow can fund.

    The buildout increasingly relies on external capital. The unsecured bond market remains the main source, with investment grade hyperscalers having issued around USD 250bn across seven currencies. A further USD 250bn of issuance is expected in 2027, with potential upside if investment plans continue to increase.The underlying AI investment case may remain intact, but a sustained rise in borrowing can still create a more difficult technical backdrop for spreads.

    Figure 1: Combined hyperscaler capex, FY26-FY29 (USD bn)

    Figure 1: Combined hyperscaler capex, FY26-FY29 (USD bn)

    Click the image to enlarge

    Source: HSBC Asset Management, Bloomberg, S&P, September 2026.

    However, headline public bond issuance is only part of the story. AI is increasingly being financed through a wider mix of bonds, leases, bank loans, project structures, guarantees and other off-balance sheet arrangements. For investors, understanding where the obligation ultimately sits is becoming increasingly important.

    Large funding requirements do not necessarily mean poor economics.

    The AI build out combines assets with very different economic lives. Much depends on the nature of the assets being financed, how long they remain useful and how quickly they begin to generate cash.

    Figure 2: AI stack contribution to return on invested capital (per cent)

    Figure 2: AI stack contribution to return on invested capital (per cent)

    Click the image to enlarge

    Source: HSBC Asset Management, Morgan Stanley Research, Amazon Q2’26 Earnings Call, Illustrative Purposes, September 2026.

    Most AI capacity is being contracted for at least five years, giving stronger issuers greater visibility over the revenues against which they are borrowing. The shortest lived computing equipment may require frequent replacement as technology improves, but much of the supporting infrastructure does not. Servers and networking equipment, for example, can reach break even in less than three years but with useful lives of around just five to six years. Buildings and power infrastructure last considerably longer and can support several generations of equipment- a data centre shell, grid connection or cooling system can continue to generate value through multiple technology cycles. Assessing the entire investment against the replacement cycle of chips therefore risks overstating the effective capital burden.

    Monetisation can also take several forms. Hyperscalers can rent directly to AI laboratories and enterprises, while their own models can generate additional demand for cloud infrastructure. As capacity comes online, contracted backlogs can convert into revenue, while AI can support adjacent businesses including software, search, e-commerce, databases, networking and security. The ability to monetise the same infrastructure through multiple channels helps explain why large upfront investment can still generate attractive economics.

    The investment can therefore work if demand arrives broadly as expected. If monetisation takes longer, utilisation disappoints or capacity is built ahead of demand, the same fixed cost infrastructure becomes more difficult to absorb.

    At the same time, falling AI model prices could change where the returns accrue but may not be necessarily negative for the infrastructure layer.

    Open AI models are rapidly closing part of the performance gap with proprietary frontier models, while cheaper alternatives are becoming sufficient for a growing range of enterprise tasks. That could put pressure on the pricing power of individual model developers, particularly where users do not require the most capable model for every task.

    For infrastructure providers such as the hyperscalers, however, cheaper AI can stimulate adoption. More usage still requires computing capacity, storage, networking and security, and most enterprises are unlikely to build those capabilities themselves. A more fragmented model market can therefore coexist with rising demand for the underlying infrastructure.

    This means that lower model prices can compress returns in one layer while increasing volumes in another. The credit question is consequently not simply whether AI usage grows, but where the revenues and cash flows generated by that usage ultimately accrue.

    Top-down estimates may overestimate funding needs compared to issuer-level analysis, while strong credit quality may coexist with elevated issuance and wider spreads driven by market supply.

    A top-down calculation that assumes around 30 per cent of hyperscaler capex is funded with unsecured debt produces a materially larger funding requirement than building estimates issuer by issuer. The difference reflects the flexibility available to the largest companies. Investment plans extend over several years, cash balances remain substantial and issuers can alter the timing and mix of bonds, leases and other forms of financing while raising capital.

    Even so, issuance is likely to remain elevated. Strong fundamentals and heavy supply can coexist as companies may remain highly creditworthy. But investors may still demand more spread simply to absorb repeated new issuance.

    This distinction between fundamental credit quality and market technicals is likely to become increasingly important. Strong earnings can keep leverage manageable, yet an unusually large volume of bonds can still affect relative value.

    The funding picture is more complicated than bond supply alone. As leases, guarantees and other off-balance sheet structures become more prevalent, it is important to identify where the economic obligation ultimately sits.

    Traditional leverage captures bonds, loans and recognised lease obligations. However, the AI build out increasingly creates commitments that do not initially appear as conventional debt. A data centre lease, for example, may already be contractually committed while the facility is still under construction. Residual value guarantees can similarly create an economic liability where the future value of a data centre or a pool of chips falls below the amount guaranteed. Certain unavoidable purchase or energy commitments may also have debt-like characteristics.

    While adjustments can be made by using reported debt and lease obligations as the starting point and then incorporating future leases and other off-balance-sheet commitments into adjusted leverage. The difficulty is that disclosure remains uneven, requiring assumptions about when commitments begin, how long they run and how much residual value remains.

    For some of the larger hyperscalers, incorporating these commitments can bring adjusted leverage closer to rating agency thresholds even while underlying credit fundamentals remain strong. Yet that need not translate into a downgrade. Robust earnings, growing contracted revenues and the productive use of new borrowing can provide capacity to absorb this higher leverage.

    Figure 3: All-in net leverage by hyperscaler

    Figure 3: All-in net leverage by hyperscaler

    Click the image to enlarge

    Figure 4: Purchase commitments that may not be included

    Figure 4: Purchase commitments that may not be included

    Click the image to enlarge

    Source: HSBC AM, company filings, S&P. Data as of September 2026.

    Across the sector, therefore, rising leverage needs to be assessed alongside earnings, cash flow, liquidity and the pace at which new capacity begins to monetise. Greater disclosure should gradually make this easier. Accounting developments around AI related capital commitments and contingent liabilities could give investors a clearer picture of exposures that today often require significant estimation. But until disclosure catches up with financial innovation, headline debt alone will remain an incomplete measure.

    For much of the past 18 months, credit markets have rewarded exposure to AI growth with relatively little distinction between how that growth was financed. That may become harder to sustain as the capital demands increase.

    A company with committed capital, contracted revenues and sufficient liquidity to complete its development pipeline is fundamentally different from one that still requires repeated access to debt and equity markets. The first can focus largely on execution; the second must successfully finance each additional stage of growth.

    Investment grade tenants, residual value protection, amortising debt and revenues that begin once a facility is delivered can reduce reliance on future refinancing. The relevant question is therefore not simply how large the development pipeline is. It is how much additional capital still needs to be raised before that pipeline begins producing cash.

    In this way, apparently similar AI exposures can deserve very different credit treatment. Two borrowers can have comparable growth prospects but significantly different financing risks if one has already secured its capital and the other remains dependent on future market access.

    The funding challenge is not confined to the hyperscalers.

    Semiconductor manufacturers and other participants in the AI supply chain are increasingly supporting customers through equity investments, guarantees and other financing arrangements. Strategically, this can support demand for their own products. From a credit perspective, however, it creates a second layer of exposure.

    The size of these commitments can be large, but their effect depends on whether they are contingent or already drawn, how quickly they build, the value of the underlying collateral, and the issuer’s ability to generate free cash flow over the same period.

    The distinction in how structure, timing and location of the funding determines the credit outcome becomes clearer when the same investment cycle is viewed across different regions.

    The AI build out is global, but the financial systems supporting it are different. Those differences determine where public bond supply appears, which balance sheets carry the leverage and how quickly financing pressure reaches credit markets.

    1. US: public markets absorb the build-out.

    The US sits at the centre of AI capex and relies heavily on deep public capital markets. Large investment grade issuers can access unsecured bonds at scale, while leases, project structures and other off-balance sheet arrangements provide additional channels.

    That breadth of financing is a strength because it allows very large investment programmes to proceed without depending on any single source of capital. Yet the public credit market is having to do much of the heavy lifting.

    Whether earnings and monetisation can keep pace with the capital being raised while investors continue to absorb repeated issuance without requiring materially wider spreads is a key question.

    There are also regulatory and execution constraints. Federal policy remains broadly supportive of maintaining US leadership in AI, but state and local resistance to data centre development has increased. So far, that pushback has generally resulted in delays or pauses rather than outright prohibitions. Restrictions on new projects could also increase the value of capacity that has already secured power, land and permitting.

    2. Asia: financing has so far been less reliant on debt capital markets, but the scope for bond supply is emerging.

    Asia is the world’s second largest data centre market and capacity could more than double by 2030, with China the largest market and several South and Southeast Asian markets among the faster growing locations. Associated infrastructure investment could reach around USD 500bn, compared with roughly USD 2.5tn in the US.

    Much of the associated investment has not so far been raised via public bond markets, but through banks, construction loans, project finance and private capital, which remain the dominant funding sources for physical infrastructure. Equity sponsors frequently include global private equity and infrastructure funds, while tenants – including both Asian and US hyperscalers – fund much of chip and server investment. Power requirements are financed by utilities.

    Figure 5: Funding party of capex

    Category
    *Est. share
    Principal funding party
    Typical financing model
    Core, shell and critical infra. 30% DC developer / operator Equity: Global PEs, Infra funds
    Debt: Bank construction loans, project loans
    Chips and servers 50% Tenant / Hyperscaler Corporate cash flows, balance sheet. GPU financing emerging
    Power generation 20% Utilities Traditional utility-led. Co-fund with developers emerging

    Source: BNP, Goldman, HSBC AM? September 2026.
    Note: * Referencing US mix. Data as of September 2026.

    Figure 6: Aggregate debt funding mix (1H26)

    Figure 6: Aggregate debt funding mix (1H26)

    Click the image to enlarge

    Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg. Data as of September 2026.

    China has a regional financing advantage. Project loans can be priced below 3 per cent with maturities of 10–15 years, compared with roughly 6 per cent and shorter tenors in several other Asian markets. Public data centre bonds remain comparatively rare. Chinese hyperscalers make much greater use of bank financing than US peers. Bank loans account for more than half of their debt – around four times the share seen among similar US firms.

    AI economics within China are different

    Domestic models have become increasingly competitive while remaining cheaper to use. Consumer adoption benefits from large digital ecosystems in which AI can be embedded into existing applications spanning commerce, entertainment, social networking and payments. That creates a large potential user base and multiple routes to monetisation.

    The harder question is whether usage converts into margins and cash flow. Cloud remains the clearest near term monetisation channel, but it is earlier in its development than in the US and domestic competition is intense.

    Figure 7: AliCloud revenue growth (y/y) versus US peers

    Figure 7: AliCloud revenue growth (y/y) versus US peers

    Click the image to enlarge

    Figure 8: AliCloud EBIT margin versus US peers

    Figure 8: AliCloud EBIT margin versus US peers

    Click the image to enlarge

    Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg. Data as of September 2026.

    At the model layer, revenues are emerging but operating losses are expected to persist through 2027 as enterprise monetisation remains immature and competition among developers remains intense.

    Figure 9: AI Labs’ Revenue (USD bn)

    Figure 9: AI Labs’ Revenue (USD bn)

    Click the image to enlarge

    Figure 10: AI Labs’ EBIT loss

    Figure 10: AI Labs’ EBIT loss

    Click the image to enlarge

    Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg. Data as of September 2026.

    This creates another version of the same credit question seen in the US: how long can investment run ahead of monetisation? There is also a potentially important upside risk. If lower cost models stimulate much broader usage, demand for computing capacity could rise faster than currently assumed, shifting the constraint away from model capability and towards the availability of infrastructure and funding. China’s state supported data centre build out could become particularly relevant in that scenario.

    Not all parts of the Asian AI ecosystem face the same funding challenge.

    Memory and semiconductor producers are among the most direct beneficiaries of the global infrastructure cycle. Strong demand is translating into sharply higher earnings and free cash flow for several major producers, helping improve net cash positions and rating momentum. The cyclicality of memory remains an important risk, but retaining substantial cash during the upswing can create a much stronger balance sheet cushion for the next downturn.

    3. Europe: infrastructure without the same financing burden.

    Europe’s data centre market is smaller than that of the US and Asia and more constrained by power availability, grid connections, land and planning. Around 65 per cent of operational capacity remains concentrated in the major Frankfurt, London, Amsterdam, Paris and Dublin hubs, although secondary locations in the Nordics and Southern Europe are beginning to grow. Hyperscalers account directly for only around a quarter of continental European capacity.

    Figure 11: Operational capacity within region (per cent)

    Figure 11: Operational capacity within region (per cent)

    Click the image to enlarge

    Figure 12: European capacity breakdown (per cent)

    Figure 12: European capacity breakdown (per cent)

    Click the image to enlarge

    Source: HSBC AM, Bloomberg. Data as of September 2026.

    Europe also has less locally available capital for data centre development than the US, while planning and regulation are fragmented across and within countries. These constraints can slow development even where national governments are supportive. Funding therefore looks different again. Bank lending remains the main source for European data centres, with private credit also active. But hyperscaler issuance is now accounting for around 9 per cent of euro investment grade supply, and securitisation is beginning to emerge as an alternative source of funding.

    An estimated 70–80 per cent of AI investment in Europe is being undertaken by US hyperscalers. Europe is therefore hosting a growing share of AI infrastructure without European corporates carrying the same financing burden. That shifts the European credit story towards the companies supplying the infrastructure such as semiconductor equipment, power electronics, engineering, cooling, networking, electrical systems and enterprise software. Many of these businesses can gain AI related revenue without undertaking hyperscaler level capex themselves.

    A regional overview helps to understand the nuances of the AI credit landscape.

    In the US, the key risk is that monetisation disappoints or takes longer than expected while leverage and external financing continue to rise. Overbuilding, financial complexity and regulatory delays could all increase pressure.

    In Asia, three risks stand out. Bank funded investment could migrate towards public bonds and create new supply; monetisation may not generate enough cash to support the investment being made; and sanctions or tighter export restrictions could disrupt parts of the Chinese ecosystem.

    In Europe, the financing risk is smaller, but power availability, planning and fragmented regulation may restrict development. The investment question is also increasingly one of valuation i.e. where balance sheets are strong and capex requirements manageable, spreads may already capture much of the benefit.

    The scale of investment remains substantial, but large capital requirements do not automatically imply weak credit.

    The outcome depends on whether assets generate cash quickly enough, how much financing has already been secured and who ultimately bears the economic liabilities. Productive assets, long contracted revenues, strong free cash flow and diversified funding sources can all support additional leverage.

    Fixed-income investors need to make the distinction between companies that have the capital, liquidity and contracted demand to execute their plans and those whose growth still depends on repeated access to financing.

    The same technology cycle is being financed through public bonds in the US, bank and project finance in Asia, and largely externally funded infrastructure in Europe, making the structure of financing, rather than the technology theme alone, central to assessing global credit exposure.

    Source: HSBC Asset Management, November 2026.
    The views expressed above were held at the time of preparation and are subject to change without notice. Any forecast, projection or target where provided is indicative only and not guaranteed in any way. HSBC Asset Management accepts no liability for any failure to meet such forecast, projection or target.

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